While we know our northern friends may not feel it, in the South, Spring is
here. So we thought we'd share a few of our gardening sites appropriate
for this time of the year. Along with gardening, there's grilling, and getting
ready to diet so that you can fit back into that bathing suit this summer!
Few events in American history have been the subject of so much
misrepresentation as the battle of Sand Creek. It has gone down into history as
an indefensible massacre of peaceable Indians, and perhaps nothing that can now
be said will change this erroneous impression of the world at large,
notwithstanding the fact that the accusation is unjust and a libel upon the
people of Colorado. Worst of all, it was given wide publicity through the
reports of two Congressional committees following unfair, one-sided, and
prejudiced investigations. Unfortunately, at that time, Colorado, being a
Territory, had no Senators or Representatives in Congress to defend the good
name of its people, and to add to the bad features of the situation, its people
at home realized but dimly what was taking place at Washington, until after the
mischief was done; consequently to a great extent the Congressional
investigations went by default, so far as the people of Colorado were concerned.
It should be kept in mind that Colorado, comparatively speaking, was more remote
from the rest of the world at that time than Alaska is today, and the means of
disseminating news throughout the Territory were exceedingly limited. From early
in November of 1864 until March, 1865, the coaches that carried the mail between
the Missouri River towns and Denver ceased running on account of the hostility
of the Indians, and all this time Colorado was cut off from the rest of the
world, except for a limited telegraph service that did not reach any point in
the Territory outside of Denver. Consequently, the enemies of Colonel Chivington
and the Third Colorado Cavalry, had full sway in their efforts to blacken the
reputation of these representative citizens of Colorado. I wish to emphasize the
fact that a large majority of the members of the Third Colorado Cavalry were
high-class men, whatever may be said to the contrary. Colorado had been settled
less than six years and most of its inhabitants had come to the Territory in
1860, only four years previously. These people were from every part of the
United States, many of them farmers, merchants, and professional men, and the
men who enlisted in the Third Colorado were largely of this class.
The accusations on which the various Congressional and military investigations
were based had their origin in the jealousy of military officers. It was the
same kind of spirit that caused the loss of more than one battle in the Civil
War. However, at Sand Creek, on account of the secrecy of preparations, the
victory could not be prevented, but the good effects could be, and were,
completely nullified, to the great detriment of the people of Colorado; and this
was done by officers who had been former residents of the Territory and were
indebted to it for their official positions. But fully to understand the animus
of these officers, it is necessary for the reader to know something of their
personality, as well as that of the other officers involved in the controversy.
Colonel John M. Chivington, who was in command at the battle of Sand Creek, and
who was the principal target throughout the various investigations, was the Rev.
John M. Chivington, who from 1860 to 1862 was in charge of the Methodist
missions in the region now forming the State of Colorado. He was a member of the
Kansas-Nebraska Conference, and had been selected for this mission work because
of his unusual energy, ability, and force of character. The commanding position
that the Methodist Church early assumed in the Territory under his
administration confirmed the wisdom of his appointment.
Upon the organization of the First Colorado Volunteer Cavalry in the early part
of 1862, Mr. Chivington resigned his position as presiding elder of the Rocky
Mountain District, and was commissioned Major of the new regiment. He at once
became the regiment's most influential officer. He was the most prominent figure
in its wonderful march to New Mexico, and the remarkable victories won by it
over the invading Confederates were largely due to his brilliant leadership. By
the end of the active campaign, which was a short one, Major Chivington had
become so popular with the officers and enlisted men that upon the resignation
of John P. Slough, the Colonel of the regiment, soon after, he was promoted to
that position over Lieutenant-Colonel Samuel F. Tappan on petition of every
commissioned officer of the regiment. Here was the beginning of all his
troubles, as will be seen farther along in my narrative. Later, Colonel
Chivington was appointed by General Canby to the command of the military
district of Southern New Mexico, and was afterward transferred to the command of
the military district of Colorado, which position he held at the time of the
battle of Sand Creek.
Colonel Chivington was a man of commanding personality, and possessed marked
ability both as a preacher and as an army officer. I can do no better than quote
what General Frank Hall says of him in his History of Colorado:
Though wholly unskilled the
science of war, with but little
knowledge of drill and
discipline, Major Chivington, of
Herculean frame and gigantic
stature, possessed the courage
and exhibited the discreet
boldness, dash, and brilliancy
in action which distinguished
the more illustrious of our
volunteer officers during the
war. His first encounter with
the Texans at Apache Canon was
sudden and more or less of a
surprise. The occasion demanded
not only instantaneous action,
but such disposition of his
force as to render it most
effective against superior
numbers and the highly
advantageous position of the
enemy. He seemed to comprehend
at a glance the necessities of
the situation and handled his
troops like a veteran. His
daring and rapid movement across
the mountains and the total
destruction of the enemy's
train, simultaneously with the
battle of Pigeon's Ranch, again
attested his excellent
generalship. It put an end to
the war by forcing the invaders
to a precipitate flight back to
their homes. He hesitated at
nothing Sure of the devotion and
gallantry of his men, he was
always ready for any adventure,
however desperate, which
promised the discomfiture of his
adversaries.
We cannot but believe that had
his application for the transfer
of his regiment to the Army of
the Potomac, or to any of the
great armies operating under
Grant, been acceded to, he would
have made a still prouder record
for himself, the regiment, and
the Territory. That he was
endowed with the capabilities of
a superior commander, none who
saw him in action will deny.
I fully concur in General Hall's estimate
of Colonel Chivington's marked ability. I
knew him well, as he was a frequent visitor
at our house in the mining town of Hamilton,
in the early days. The overshadowing
reputation made by Colonel Chivington in the
campaign against the Texas invaders of New
Mexico, and his subsequent promotion to the
colonelcy of the regiment over
Lieutenant-Colonel Samuel F. Tappan,
although apparently acquiesced in at the
time, aroused a spirit of jealousy, envy,
and antagonism against him on the part of a
small group of officers headed by
Lieutenant-Colonel Tappan and Major E. W.
Wynkoop, which was participated in by
Captain Soule, Lieutenant Cramer, and other
subordinates. This antagonism manifested
itself on every later occasion. It was the
jealousy of mediocrity manifested against
superior ability and worth; for one can
search the records of the First Colorado in
vain for anything noteworthy ever
accomplished by either Tappan, Wynkoop, or
Soule. After their return from New Mexico,
these officers never allowed an opportunity
to pass for discrediting and injuring the "
Preacher Colonel, " and after the battle of
Sand Creek they never tired of referring to
it as an evidence of his unfitness.
Lieutenant-Colonel Tappan had been a
professional newspaper correspondent before
entering the army; consequently, he had no
trouble in filling the Eastern publications
with exaggerated and distorted accounts of
the battle. In his crusade he had the active
aid of Major Wynkoop, of S. G. Colley, the
Indian agent at Fort Lyon, and of all the
Indian traders, interpreters, half- breeds,
and others of similar character congregated
around the Indian agency. He also had the
support of the Indian Bureau at Washington,
which usually took the sentimental side of
every question affecting the Indians.
Prior to 1864 Indians who had been on the
warpath during the summer were permitted to
make peace in the fall, remain unmolested
during the winter, receive annuities, rest
up, and accumulate ammunition for the coming
summer's raids; but in that year the
overtures of the Cheyenne and Arapaho were
rejected, except upon the condition that
they deliver up their arms and submit to the
military authorities. This they not only
refused to do, but continued their
depredations at places convenient to their
winter camps, and received from Colonel
Chivington's command the punishment they so
richly deserved. Naturally this meant great
financial loss to the Indian agents,
traders, and hangers-on around the Indian
agency; and, as a result, these people
actively joined in the attack upon Colonel
Chivington.
This crusade resulted in two
Congressional investigations of the battle,
and also in a hearing by a military
commission. Before the Joint Special
Committee of the two Houses of Congress the
principal witnesses were Major Wynkoop,
Captain Soule, Lieutenant Cramer, two Indian
agents, two Indian traders, two half-breeds,
and one interpreter to sustain the
accusations, and only Governor Evans and
three minor officers of the Third Colorado
regiment for the defense. Aside from
Governor Evans and the three minor officers
just mentioned, the witnesses were extremely
hostile to Colonel Chivington and were ready
to go to any length in their testimony in
order to blacken his reputation and that of
the Third Colorado. In the investigation
before the Joint Special Committee, neither
Colonel Chivington nor Colonel Shoup was
present or represented in any way. In the
hearing before the Committee on the Conduct
of the War, Colonel Shoup was not
represented, and Colonel Chivington only by
means of a deposition. As a result of these
partial and one- sided investigations, both
committees condemned Chivington and
pronounced the battle a massacre. The most
unjust and absurd investigation of all was
that made by the military commission, which
was composed of three officers of the First
Colorado Cavalry, all subordinates of
Colonel Chivington, headed by his inveterate
enemy Lieutenant- Colonel Samuel F. Tappan.
The accusation made at each hearing was that
the Cheyenne and Arapahoe Indians attacked
by Colonel Chivington's command at Sand
Creek were not only friendly to the whites,
but were under the protection of the
military authorities at Fort Lyon, and that
the battle was, by the consent, if not by
the direction of Colonel Chivington, an
indiscriminate massacre. All of this I
believe is proved to be untrue, to the
satisfaction of any reasonable person, by
the facts related in my account of the
battle, and of the hostilities in El Paso
County and elsewhere preceding it. In
corroboration of my statements as to the
hostile character of the Indians punished at
Sand Creek, and to show the conditions
existing elsewhere in the Territory previous
thereto, I quote from Governor Evans's reply
to the report of the Committee on the
Conduct of the War, dated August 6, 1865.
In the Territorial days of Colorado, the
Governor was ex-officio Superintendent of
Indian Affairs. At the time of the Sand
Creek battle, the Hon. John Evans, formerly
of Illinois, was Governor of Colorado, and
had held that office since the spring of
1862 Governor Evans was a personal friend of
President Lincoln, and had been appointed
Governor because of his high character,
great ability, and efficiency in
administrative affairs. Governor Evans's
supervision of Indian affairs in Colorado
during 1862, 1863, and 1864 made him a
better-qualified witness as to the
conditions existing among the various tribes
during these years than any man living. The
following extracts from his reply to that
part of the report of the Committee on the
Conduct of the War, which, under the
heading, "Massacre of the Cheyenne Indians,
" refers to his responsibility in the
matter, tells of the attitude of the Indians
towards the whites during that period and of
his own strenuous efforts to avert
hostilities.
Executive Department And
Superintendency Of Indian
Affairs, C. T.
Denver, August 6, 1865.
To The Public:
I have just seen, for the first
time, a copy of the report of
the Committee on the Conduct of
the War, headed, "Massacre of
Cheyenne Indians."
As it does me great injustice,
and by its partial, unfair, and
erroneous statements will
mislead the public, I
respectfully ask a suspension of
opinion in my case until I shall
have time to present the facts
to said committee or some
equally high authority, and ask
a correction. In the meantime, I
desire to lay a few facts before
the public. The report begins:
"In the summer of 1864 Governor
Evans, of Colorado Territory, as
acting Superintendent of Indian
Affairs, sent notice to the
various bands and tribes of
Indians within his jurisdiction,
that such as desired to be
considered friendly to the
whites should repair to the
nearest military post in order
to be protected from the
soldiers who were to take the
field against the hostile
Indians."
This statement is true as to
such notice having been sent,
but conveys the false impression
that it was at the beginning of
hostilities, and the declaration
of war. The truth is, it was
issued by authority of the
Indian Department months after
the war had become general, for
the purpose of inducing the
Indians to cease hostilities,
and to protect those who had
been, or would become, friendly
from the inevitable dangers to
which they were exposed. This
"notice" may be found published
in the report of the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs
for 1864, page 218.
The report continues:
"About the close of the summer some Cheyenne
Indians, in the neighborhood of the Smoky
Hill, sent word to Major Wynkoop, commanding
at Fort Lyon, that they had in their
possession, and were willing to deliver up,
some white captives they had purchased of
other Indians. Major Wynkoop, with a force
of over one hundred men, visited these
Indians and recovered the white captives. On
his return he was accompanied by a number of
the chiefs and leading men of the Indians,
whom he had brought to visit Denver for the
purpose of conferring with the authorities
there in regard to keeping the peace. Among
them were Black Kettle and White Antelope,
of the Cheyenne, and some chiefs of the
Arapaho. The council was held, and these
chiefs stated that they were friendly to the
whites and always had been."
Again they say:
"All the testimony goes to show that the
Indians under the immediate control of Black
Kettle and White Antelope, of the Cheyenne,
and Left Hand of the Arapaho, were, and had
always been, friendly to the whites, and had
not been guilty of any acts of hostility or
depredations."
This word, which the committee say was sent
to Major Wynkoop, was a letter to United
States Indian Agent, Major Colley, which is
published in the report of the Commissioner
of Indian Affairs for 1865, page 233, and is
as follows:
"Cheyenne Village, August
29, 1864.
"Major Colley:
"We received a letter from Bent
wishing us to make peace. We
held a council in regard to it.
All come to the conclusion to
make peace with you, providing
you make peace with the Kiowa,
Comanche, Arapaho, Apaches, and
Sioux. We are going to send a
messenger to the Kiowa and to
the other nations about our
going to make peace with you. We
heard that you have some
[prisoners] in Denver. We have
seven prisoners of yours which
we are willing to give up,
providing you give up yours.
There are three war parties out
yet, and two of Arapaho. They
have been out some time, and
expected in soon. When we held
this council there were few
Arapaho and Sioux present.
"We want true news from you in
return. This is a letter.
"Black Kettle and the other
Chiefs."
Compare the above extract from the report
of the committee with this published letter
of Black Kettle, and the admission of the
Indians in the council at Denver.
The committee say the prisoners proposed to
be delivered up were purchased of other
Indians. Black Kettle, in his letter,
says:
"We have seven prisoners of yours, which
we are willing to give up, providing you
give up yours." They say nothing about
prisoners whom they had purchased. On the
other hand, in the council held in Denver,
Black Kettle said:
"Major Wynkoop was kind enough to receive
the letter and visited them in camp, to whom
they delivered four white prisoners, one
other (Mrs. Snyder) having killed herself;
that there are two women and one child yet
in their camp whom they will deliver up as
soon as they can get them in; Laura Roper,
16 or 17 years; Ambrose Asher, 7 or 8 years;
Daniel Marble, 7 or 8 years; Isabel Ubanks,
4 or 5 years. The prisoners still with them
[are] Mrs. Ubanks and babe, and a Mrs.
Norton who was taken on the Platte. Mrs.
Snyder is the name of the woman who hung
herself. The boys were taken between Fort
Kearney and the Blue."
Again: They did not deny having
captured the prisoners, when I told them
that having the prisoners in their
possession was evidence of their having
committed the depredations when they were
taken. But White Antelope said: "We (the
Cheyenne) took two prisoners west of
Kearney, and destroyed the trains." Had they
purchased the prisoners, they would not have
been slow to make it known in this council.
The committee say the chiefs went to Denver
to confer with the authorities about
keeping the peace. Black Kettle says:
"All come to the conclusion to make peace
with you providing you will make peace
with the Kiowa, Comanche, Arapaho, Apache,
and Sioux."
Again the committee say:
"All the testimony goes to
show that the Indians under the
immediate control of Black
Kettle and White Antelope, of
the Cheyenne, and Left Hand, of
the Arapaho, were, and had
been friendly to the whites, and
had not been guilty of any acts
of hostility or depredations."
Black Kettle says in his letter: "We
received a letter from Bent, wishing us to
make peace." Why did Bent send a letter to
friendly Indians, and want to make
peace with Indians who had always been
friendly? Again they say: "We have held
a council in regard to it." Why did they
hold a council in regard to making peace,
when they were already peaceable? Again they
say: "All come to the conclusion to make
peace with you providing you make
peace with the Kiowa, Comanche, Arapaho,
Apache, and Sioux. We have seven prisoners
of yours, which we are willing to give up,
providing you give up yours. There are three
war [not peace] parties out
yet, and two of Arapaho."
Every line of this letter shows that they
were and had been at war. I desire to throw
additional light upon this assertion of the
committee that these Indians "were and had
been friendly to the whites, and had not
been guilty of any acts of hostility or
depredations"; for it is upon this point
that the committee accuses me of
prevarication.
In the council held at Denver, White
Antelope said: "We [the Cheyenne] took two
prisoners west of Kearney and destroyed the
trains." This was one of the most
destructive and bloody raids of the war.
Again, Neva (Left Hand's brother) said: "The
Comanche, Kiowa, and Sioux have done much
more harm than we have."
The entire report of this council shows that
the Indians had been at war, and had been
"guilty of acts of hostility and
depredations."
As showing more fully the status and
disposition of these Indians, I call your
attention to the following extract from the
report of Major Wynkoop, published in the
report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs
for 1864, page 234, and a letter from Major
Colley, their agent; same report, page 230.
Also statement of Robert North; same report,
page 224:
"Fort Lyon, Colorado, Sept.
18, 1864.
"Sir:
"Taking with me under strict
guard the Indians I had in my
possession, I reached my
destination and was confronted
by from six to eight hundred
Indian warriors, drawn up in
line of battle and prepared to
fight.
"Putting on as bold a front as I
could under the circumstances I
formed my command in as good
order as possible for the
purpose of acting on the
offensive or defensive, as might
be necessary, and advanced
towards them, at the same time
sending forward one of the
Indians I had with me, as an
emissary, to state that I had
come for the purpose of holding
a consultation with the chiefs
of the Arapaho and Cheyenne, to
come to an understanding which
might result in mutual benefit;
that I had not come de-siring
strife, but was prepared for it
if necessary, and advised them
to listen to what I had to say,
previous to making any more
warlike demonstrations.
"They consented to meet me in
council, and I then proposed to
them that if they desired peace
to give me palpable evidence of
their sincerity by delivering
into my hands their white
prisoners. I told them that I
was not authorized to conclude
terms of peace with them, but if
they acceded to my proposition I
would take what chiefs they
might choose to select to the
Governor of Colorado Territory,
state the circumstances to him,
and that I believed it would
result in what it was their
desire to accomplish 'peace with
their white brothers.' I had
reference particularly to the
Arapahoe and Cheyenne tribes.
"The council was
divided-undecided-and could not
come to an understanding among
themselves. I told them that I
would march to a certain
locality, distant twelve miles,
and await a given time for their
action in the matter. I took a
strong position in the locality
named, and remained three days.
In the interval they brought in
and turned over four white
prisoners, all that was possible
for them at the time being to
turn over, the balance of the
seven being (as they stated)
with another band far to the
northward.
"I have the
principal chiefs of the two
tribes with me, and propose
starting immediately to DenVer,
to put into effect the
aforementioned proposition made
by me to them.
"They agree to deliver up the
balance of the prisoners as soon
as it is possible to procure
them, which can be done better
from Denver City than from this
point.
"I have the honor, Governor, to
be your obedient servant,"
E. W. WYNKOOP,
"Major First Col. Cav. Com'd'g
Fort Lyon, C. T.
His Excellency, JOHN EVANS,
Governor of Colorado, Denver, C. T.
Fort Lyon, Colorado Territory, July 26,
1864.
Sir:
When I last wrote you, I was in hopes
that our Indian troubles were at an end.
Colonel Chivington has just arrived from
Lamed and gives a sad account of affairs at
that post. They have killed some ten men
from a train, and run off all the stock from
the post.
"As near as they can learn, all the tribes
were engaged in it. The colonel will give
you the particulars. There is no dependence
to be put in any of them. I have done
everything in my power to keep the peace; I
now think a little powder and lead is the
best food for them.
"Respectfully, your obedient servant,"
S. G. COLLEY,
United States Indian Agent.
Hon. JOHN EVANS,
Governor and Superintendent Indian Affairs.
The following statement by Robert North was
made to me:
"November 10, 1863."
Having recovered an Arapahoe
prisoner (a squaw) from the Ute,
I obtained the confidence of the
Indians completely. I have lived
with them from a boy and my wife
is an Arapahoe.
"In honor of my exploit in
recovering the prisoner, the
Indians recently gave me a `big
medicine dance' about fifty
miles below Fort Lyon, on the
Arkansas River, at which the
leading chiefs and warriors of
several of the tribes of the
plains met.
"The Comanche, Apaches, Kiowa,
the northern band of Arapaho,
and all of the Cheyenne, with
the Sioux, have pledged one
another to go to war with the
whites as soon as they can
procure ammunition in the
spring. I have heard them
discuss the matter often, and
the few of them who opposed it
were forced to be quiet, and
were really in danger of their
lives. I saw the principal
chiefs pledge to each other that
they would be friendly and shake
hands with the whites until they
procured ammunition and guns, so
as to be ready when they strike.
Plundering to get means has
already commenced; and the plan
is to commence the war at
several points in the sparse
settlements early in the spring.
They wanted me to join them in
the war, saying that they would
take a great many white women
and children prisoners, and get
a heap of property, blankets,
etc.; but while I am connected
with them by marriage, and live
with them, I am yet a white man,
and wish to avoid bloodshed.
There are many Mexicans with the
Comanche and Apache Indians, all
of whom urge on the war,
promising to help the Indians
themselves, and that a great
many more Mexicans would come up
from New Mexico for the purpose
in the spring."
In addition to the statement showing that
all the Cheyenne were in the alliance, I
desire to add the following frank admission
from the Indians in the council:
"Governor Evans explained
that smoking the war-pipe was a
figurative term, but their
conduct had been such as to show
that they had an understanding
with other tribes.
"Several Indians: We acknowledge
that our actions have given you
reason to believe this."
In
addition to all this, I refer to
the statement of Mrs. Ewbanks.
She is one of the prisoners that
Black Kettle, in the council,
said they had. Instead of
purchasing her, they first
captured her on the
Little Blue, and then sold her
to the Sioux.
Mrs. Martin, another rescued
prisoner, was captured by
the Cheyenne on Plum
Creek, west of Kearney,
with a boy nine years old. These
were the prisoners of which
White Antelope said, in the
council, "We took two prisoners
west of Kearney, and destroyed
the trains." In her published
statement she says the party who
captured her and the boy killed
eleven men and destroyed the
trains and were mostly
Cheyenne.
Thus I have proved by the Indian chiefs
named in the report, by Agent Colley and
Major Wynkoop, to whom they refer to sustain
their assertion to the contrary, that these
Indians had "been at war, and had committed
acts of hostility and depredations."
In regard to their status prior to their
council at Denver, the foregoing public
documents which I have cited show how
utterly devoid of truth or foundation is the
assertion that these Indians "had been
friendly to the whites, and had not been
guilty of any acts of hostility or
depredations."
The next paragraph of the report is as
follows:
"A northern band of
Cheyenne, known as the `Dog
Soldiers,' had been guilty of
acts of hostility; but all the
testimony goes to prove that
they had no connection with
Black Kettle's band, and acted
in spite of his authority and
influence. Black Kettle and his
band denied all connection with,
or responsibility for, the Dog
Soldiers, and Left Hand and his
band were equally friendly."
The committee and the public will be
surprised to learn the fact that these Dog
Soldiers, on which the committee throws the
slight blame for acts of hostility, were
really among Black Kettle's and White
Antelope's own warriors, in the "friendly"
camp to which Major Wynkoop made his
expedition, and their head man, Bull Bear,
was one of the prominent men of the
deputation brought in to see me at Denver.
By reference to the report of the council
with the chiefs, to which I referred the
committee, it will be observed that Black
Kettle and all present based their
propositions to make peace upon the assent
of their bands, and that these Dog Soldiers
were especially referred to.
The report continues:
"These Indians, at the
suggestion of Governor Evans and
Colonel Chivington, repaired to
Fort Lyon and placed themselves
under the protection of Major
Wynkoop, etc."
The connection of my name in this is
again wrong. I simply left them in the hands
of the military authorities, where I found
them, and my action was approved by the
Indian Bureau.
The following extracts from the report of
the council will prove this conclusively. I
stated to the Indians:
"Another reason that I am
not in a condition to make a
treaty is, that the war is
begun, and the power to make a
treaty of peace has passed from
me to the great war chief."
I also said: "Again, whatever
peace they may make must be with
the soldiers and not with me."
And again, in reply to White
Antelope's inquiry, "How can we
be protected from the soldiers
on the plains?" I said: "You
must make that arrangement with
the military chief."
